Advanced landing grounds and roads had not been developed as mandarins in Delhi feared such infrastructure would help the Chinese over-run the region in the event of a repetition of the 1962 border conflict.
The Air Force is still finding it difficult to move men and equipment to the worstaffected areas. Eastern Air Command sources said mobilization would have been faster had the IAF managed to land AN-32 or a similar large transport aircraft close to Mangan, Chungthang or Lachung.
"Delhi woke up from its slumber only recently to realize that infrastructure development is required in the northeast. This shift from its Pakistan-centric approach has led to development of facilities in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. It may take some more time for infrastructure to be built in north or east Sikkim," said a state government source.
The Union defence ministry was able to successfully reason that Sikkim should be left underdeveloped for "strategic" purposes. The fear was if China were to carry out a lightning strike across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in north Sikkim, it would be able to take the entire state by using the infrastructure built by the Union or the state government.
"The philosophy was that should such a strike take place and Indian forces be compelled to fall back, the Chinese should not get access to infrastructure that would help consolidate its position," said the official.
"In reality, this was a ridiculous strategy. China is rapidly building infrastructure on the Tibet side and lack of infrastructure on our side won't deter them. It is a matter of concern that no ALGs exist in Sikkim," said another official.
The Army is now considering a Mountain Strike Corps and may station ultralight howitzers and light tanks along the LAC. Now, IAF might also consider ALGs in north and east Sikkim.
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